


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13 Feb 1969

RECIPIENT: Director of Central Intelligence

SUBJECT: New Evidence and Assessments Concerning
Soviet ICBM

1. This memorandum is in response to your inquiry concerning the desirability of a new review [redacted] of available evidence on the Soviet ICBM program and recommends that the Panel not be reconstituted at this time.

2. For your information, since [redacted] submitted its report on 24 November 1968, the following significant new evidence and assessments concerning the Soviet ICBM program have been obtained:

a. Soviet ICBM Production and Deployment Activities:

(1) Following the Khrushchev statements concerning ICBM production, CIA undertook an assessment of Soviet ICBM production and deployment progress through mid-1968. This study (not coordinated outside CIA) was based on the assumption that Khrushchev's statements were correct and that ICBM series production started about the beginning of 1959. A Consultant's Panel could assist in evaluating the feasibility of this program, but not the validity of Khrushchev's statements per se.

(2) CIA is conducting a study of Soviet ICBM activities in Sverdlovsk which may be related to production. Preliminary findings indicate the possible timing of preparations for Soviet ICBM production, which is generally compatible with Khrushchev's statements and current estimates.

NSA and USAF review(s) completed.

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Approved For Release 2003/07/30 : CIA-RDP70T00666R000100090023-1
SUBJECT: New Evidence and Assessments Concerning Soviet ICBM

However, the available information does not provide any indication of the initiation of series production or of missile production rates, and therefore does not seem suitable for submission to a Panel.


(3) During private conversations at the Geneva Surprise Attack Discussions, 10 November-18 December 1958, some very positive Soviet statements were made concerning their ICBM, i.e., that "they have operational ICBM bases now" is more than taken numbers. Such statements would be of interest to the Panel, but in the absence of supporting evidence, we question their ability to evaluate the validity of these statements.

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(4) There is some new evidence [redacted] which may be associated with ICBM deployment; however, the evidence is too tenuous to warrant Consultants' evaluation at this time. We are continuing our efforts to acquire some firm evidence on the status of Soviet ICBM deployment.


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SUBJECT: New Brilliance and Assessments Concerning Soviet ICBM

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(2) OSA is currently engaged in a re-evaluation of the possible connections between [redacted]

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[redacted] and the Soviet ICBM program. We have not reached any firm conclusions, but anticipate obtaining some tentative conclusions within 2-4 weeks. If our re-evaluation does indicate a definite connection between these two activities, it would be a significant factor in a Consultant Panel's reassessment of the status of the Soviet ICBM. It is too early however, to evaluate the connection, if any, or to determine the effect on the Panel's last report.

(3) The 2 January Soviet lunar vehicle (NODIM) is being carefully evaluated to determine what conclusions, if any, can be derived concerning the Soviet ICBM. To date we have been unable to derive any specific conclusions concerning the Soviet ICBM, and doubt that any significant valid ICBM conclusions can be derived therefore. We therefore doubt that NODIM would provide the Consultant Panel a direct basis for reassessing the Soviet ICBM; indirectly, the degree of effort the Soviets have apparently placed on their satellite and lunar programs would have a bearing on the status of the Soviet ICBM. We doubt that this information would provide the Panel a basis for changing its last report.



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Approved For Release 2003/07/30 : CIA-RDP70T00666R000100090023-1

SUBJECT: New Evidence and Assessments Concerning Soviet ICBM

(4) Malinovsky's statement to the 21st Party Congress concerning Soviet ICBM accuracies is interesting but not sufficiently specific to merit an evaluation by the Consultant Panel.

3. It is our opinion and recommendation that there is not sufficient significant new evidence concerning the Soviet ICBM program to warrant reconvening a high level consultant panel at this time. However, when some of the above studies are complete or should we acquire some significant new data, we could reconsider the desirability and timing of reconvening the Panel.

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OTTO E. GOLDE
Assistant Director
Research and Reports



HERBERT SCOVILLE, JR.
Assistant Director
Scientific Intelligence

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26 FEB 1959

Major General Charles B. Dougher, USAF
Commander, Air Technical Intelligence Center
Wright-Patterson Air Force Base
Dayton, Ohio

Dear General Dougher:

Thank you for your letter of 12 February 1959 in which is described your establishment of a procedure for interchanging information at the working level within the intelligence community.

The results of your program when fully operating on a commodity wide basis should be most rewarding. Perhaps the program will augment to a considerable degree the current exchange of information now taking place in the monthly Air Force Working Group meetings. I refer of course to the AFCEW Working Groups on Aircraft and Armaments and on Guided Missiles and Astronautics. Incidentally, our participation in these meetings has proved to be extremely beneficial to our analysts.

We shall be pleased to follow your suggestion that the exchange be on an analyst-to-analyst basis. The views expressed in such communications would, of course, be unofficial in that they would not necessarily represent the position of this Office.

By operating on this basis the exchange will not become a burden, and a free exchange of opinions and informal discussions will be insured, which as you suggest may result in more timely solutions to intelligence problems.

John E. O'Brien
Assistant Director
Research and Reports

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Dr. Otto E. Guthe
 Assistant Director, Research and Reports
 Central Intelligence Agency
 2430 E Street, N.W.
 Washington 25, D.C.

Dear Dr. Guthe:

The problem of interchanging information at the working level has long been recognized by ATIC and the Intelligence Community in general. The benefits to be derived from informal communication among analysts of different organizations working on similar or related problems include a better understanding of areas of mutual interest, less duplication of effort, and the resultant earlier solution of analysis problems.

In an attempt to alleviate the problem of communication among working analysts, I am establishing a procedure whereby analysts of ATIC will forward informal notes on their findings to analysts of your organization and other organizations working in the same area with a request that informal comments be returned. In this way, mutual benefit may be derived. It is hoped that your analysts will forward notes to ATIC for information and comments in a similar manner.

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NRA

Incl
 Analyst to
 Analyst Note

Sincerely,

CHARLES A. NOVEMBER
 Major General, USAF
 Commander

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Next 1 Page(s) In Document Exempt

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